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Niko Tinbergen (1963) described four complementary questions to be asked of any 
animal’s behaviour in order to understand it. Two of the questions seek proximate 
explanations for behaviour: What are the material causes of behaviour? And how 
does the behaviour develop within the lifetime of an individual? These are questions 
of mechanism and ontogeny, and they are the primary focus of many psychologists 
and neuroscientists. While other chapters in this volume will explore at length the 
proximate causes of prospective cognition1, we will direct our attention to the other 
two questions, which concern the ultimate, evolutionary causes of prospection: 
function and phylogeny.  
 
Function and phylogeny 
Evolutionary explanations for an adaptation must enlighten on two key facts: first, 
the reproductive advantage that adaptation confers upon an individual animal 
(‘function’); second, the constraints imposed on that adaptation by a species’ 
                                                        
1 There is a necessary ambiguity in the definition of mental time travel as applied to non-human 
animals, as some degree of difference between species is expected even were we to find great 
similarities in the nature of prospective thought. Where we use the term ‘prospective mental time 
travel’, we refer to the system described by Suddendorf and Corballis (1997; 2007), which has formed 
the basis for the majority of subsequent comparative research into the topic. We also employ terms 
such as ‘foresight’, ‘prospective cognition’, and ‘future-thinking’. We use these terms interchangeably 
to refer to the processes necessary to represent a future event. These processes may or may not 
qualify as truly episodic in nature, but without access to a non-human animal’s subjective experience, 
this seems unknowable. Our neutrality with respect to the experiential aspects of prospective mental 
time travel should be seen as analogous to that of Clayton and Dickinson (1998) in their definition of 
‘episodic-like’ memory as an analogue of human episodic memory. 
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evolutionary history (‘phylogeny’). The first of these is easily understood. A large 
animal’s size allows it to retain heat and to fight off rivals, but also imposes a 
metabolic cost, which reduces the resources that can be devoted to producing 
offspring and increases the risk of starvation. Natural selection will favour genes that 
contribute to a more optimal trade-off between cost and benefit, and future 
generations will cluster around this optimum. In fact, the trade-off between an 
adaptation’s benefits and its metabolic cost is of central importance in the evolution 
of any new cognitive capacity. Cognitive processing requires a neural substrate, and 
big brains are expensive, making up 20-25% of the human body’s energy needs 
(Holliday, 1986; Mink et al., 1981). A ‘functional’ explanation of prospective 
cognition must therefore (i) highlight the increased fitness associated with thinking 
about the future and (ii) assert that these benefits will at least compensate for the 
concomitant increase in metabolic requirements. 
The second evolutionary question is that of ‘phylogeny’ – the constraints 
imposed by an organism’s evolutionary history. Natural selection typically acts upon 
a species gradually and continually, over many generations. A consequence of this is 
that an optimal adaptation is unreachable if it requires several generations of 
reduced fitness first. The canonical example is the vertebrate eye, which has a blind 
spot where the retinal inputs to the optic nerve converge. Because an eye with a 
blind spot is better than no eye at all, natural selection can only improve upon the 
existing eye rather than start from scratch with a blind individual. Consequently, 
vertebrate eyes have been extensively adapted to a range of ecological demands 
while retaining the suboptimal blind spot (Land and Nilsson, 2002). Psychological 
adaptations like prospective mental time travel should then be evaluated as 
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variations upon what came before. As an example, we have recently argued that 
continuity in hippocampal function across the Animal Kingdom may have 
constrained the independent evolution of prospective faculties in mammals and 
birds (Thom and Clayton, 2014).  
To summarise, an attempt to understand the evolutionary origins of 
prospective mental time travel should elucidate the specific fitness advantages 
conferred by specific variations in those psychological capacities already present in a 
species. However, the ascription of an adaptive function to a cognitive faculty like 
mental time travel depends on our knowledge of that faculty, since we cannot infer 
a cause without understanding the effect. If we wish to take a comparative approach 
– relating species differences in cognition to variations in the requirements of the 
ecological niches these species occupy – we must first know the extent of these 
species differences in cognition. In the case of prospective mental time travel, the 
focus of most empirical work has been the extent of the difference between human 
and the rest of the Animal Kingdom. Put simply: Is prospective mental time travel 
unique to humans? Answering this proximate, mechanistic question is an essential 
first step in advancing any ultimate, evolutionary account of mental time travel. It is 
therefore this question, and how best to answer it, that is the topic of the remainder 
of this chapter. 
The null hypothesis 
In setting out to identify non-human animals capable of prospective mental time 
travel we face a problem: How do we know if an observed behaviour is driven by 
prospective cognition? Consider food-caching. An animal that stores food with the 
intention of retrieving it later would certainly seem to be exhibiting some form of 
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prospective cognition. But it is also plausible that evolution has endowed the animal 
with a desire to cache food, oblivious to the future benefits of doing so. The task is 
to identify instances in which an animal acts for the future with the future in mind. 
Lloyd Morgan’s Canon, which has dominated interpretations of animal 
behaviour in the comparative study of cognition, asserts that “In no case is an animal 
activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it can be fairly 
interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological 
evolution and development” (Morgan, 1903, p. 59). In the case of food-caching, this 
means that we should assume the second explanation (oblivious desire to cache) is 
true unless we have good reason to reject it. Ignoring Morgan’s archaic use of 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’, we can see this as an application of Occam’s razor to the 
evolution of intelligence. It is, however, a flawed one. The correct locus of 
probability is the generation of mutations responsible for changes in psychological 
processing, not a subjective assertion of the complexity of the relevant process 
(though see Sober, 2005, and Fitzpatrick, 2008, for a more detailed discussion of 
Occam’s razor in Morgan’s Canon). An apparently simple behavioural rule might 
require a more improbable series of mutations than a cognitive capacity that we 
intuit to be more complex. 
A second problem for Morgan’s Canon comes from the particular aspects of 
cognition we choose to scour the Animal Kingdom for, and where we choose to look. 
Comparative psychology is not a comprehensive and dispassionate assay of all 
possible cognitive faculties in all possible species. Aside from the practical difficulties 
such an endeavour would prevent, researchers would still be limited by their own 
imaginations. We tend to look for those cognitive capacities that we see in ourselves, 
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and that we intuitively believe to be most complex. We also typically look first to our 
closest relatives, the great apes. This preference is not without foundation; Great 
apes look more like us than other animals, they have large brains like we do (Jerison, 
1973), and exhibit some behaviours that we normally think of as very human, like 
tool-use (Van Lawick-Goodall, 1970). It is however difficult to see how Occam’s razor 
can apply when we ask whether chimpanzees and bonobos share a particular 
intellectual faculty with humans. We already know the mutations responsible for the 
faculty in question have arisen because we have that faculty. The question is thus 
not ‘How many mutations were required?’, but ‘When did these mutations occur?’ 
We cannot apply a principle of parsimony to conclude that this faculty first emerged 
in a recent ancestor of modern humans and not a common ancestor of humans, 
chimpanzees, and bonobos. 
It should be noted that the above criticism only applies in cases of homology, 
in which species share a trait because they both inherited it from a shared ancestor. 
We infer homology of any shared intelligence between humans and chimpanzees 
because it is more parsimonious to assume that this intelligence emerged once in a 
shared ancestor than twice in separate lineages. The latter possibility is one of 
convergence, and the criticism of Morgan’s Canon from parsimony would not apply 
in this case. An example of convergence that we will discuss later in this chapter is 
that of intelligence, and particularly foresight, in the crow family. Because crows and 
humans are very distally related, our common ancestor is also the ancestor of all 
mammals and birds, namely a stem amniote. Unless we believe that all mammals 
and birds are capable of prospective cognition, we might conclude that a great many 
mutations were required to lose this faculty in other species. More likely, we would 
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argue that this faculty has evolved independently in crows and humans, and that 
both have simply converged on the same solution to a problem. In this case, the 
mutations responsible for prospective capacities must have occurred at least twice if 
we believe that crows are capable of prospective mental time travel. In the absence 
of any evidence to the contrary, Morgan’s Canon will lead us to the most 
parsimonious conclusion – crows cannot engage in prospective mental time travel. 
It should be apparent from the paragraphs above that Lloyd Morgan’s Canon 
is not a strong foundation for assumptions about intelligence in non-human animals, 
particularly with respect to our closest evolutionary cousins. It nonetheless reflects 
three beliefs on which to base our null hypothesis. The first is that cognitive 
explanations are likely to require a more improbable evolutionary history of 
mutations than a simpler explanation. This has some validity, though the caveats 
above should be kept in mind. The second belief is that natural selection will not 
tolerate the expense of an unnecessarily cognitive solution to a problem. This is 
justifiable in so far as we associated cognitive processing with energy requirements 
that impose opportunity costs. However, it should be noted that we have little 
definitive evidence concerning the metabolic costs of specific cognitive faculties. The 
third belief is intuitive: that there must be something that is qualitatively different 
about humans, and that something is likely to be an aspect of our intelligence. This 
third belief could prove to be incorrect, but is widely held and motivates a great deal 
of interest in animal cognition. These three beliefs supporting Morgan’s Canon are 
not strongly justifiable, but neither are they obviously wrong. In the absence of a 
better alternative, we begin with a null hypothesis that no animal, excepting a 
human, is capable of prospective mental time travel. 
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 The specific articulation of this principle most often tested is the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis, which states that “animals other than humans cannot anticipate 
future needs or drive states, and are therefore bound to a present that is defined by 
their current motivational state” (from Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997). Suddendorf 
and Corballis note in presenting this hypothesis that it retains a degree of ambiguity, 
relying on a common sense definition of “needs”. The qualification of human 
uniqueness exemplifies the scepticism of Lloyd Morgan’s Canon in limiting 
mechanistic explanations of non-human behaviour to present drive states. 
Falsification of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis is the current gold standard for claims 
of prospective cognition in non-human animals. 
 
The great apes 
Our closest relatives in the Animal Kingdom are the non-human great apes: orang-
utans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos. As we have posited above, the argument 
for the uniqueness of human intelligence may not rely as surely on phylogenetic 
parsimony in the case of the Great apes. These animals are therefore the logical 
starting place for our search. 
 Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) summarise several anecdotal observations 
of Great ape behaviour that might indicate a capacity to plan for the future. These 
include a male chimpanzee following and sleeping near to a female while she is in 
estrus (Goodall, 1986), and carrying straw from inside to make a warm nest on a cold 
night (De Waal, 1982). A more recent example comes from Furuvik zoo in Sweden, 
where a male chimpanzee had been collecting stones and pieces of concrete and 
later throwing them at visitors (Osvath, 2009). The collecting behaviour had only 
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been observed in the hours before the zoo opened (so in the absence of visitors to 
throw at), and the caches of projectiles were always discovered on the shoreline 
facing the visitors. These observations are intriguing, but their anecdotal nature 
limits their usefulness. In the absence of controlled experiments it is difficult to draw 
any concrete conclusions (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2010; though see also Osvath 
and Karvonen, 2012 for a more systematic exploration of the Furuvik chimpanzee’s 
stone-throwing). 
A recent study of apparent route-planning in chimpanzees faces the same 
criticisms. Janmaat et al. (2014) observed the movements, nesting and feeding 
behaviors of five female chimpanzees in the wild for 275 days. The subjects travelled 
to a fruit tree each morning for breakfast, and departed earlier when competition 
for the fruit was likely to be greater (normally smaller fruit that could also be eaten 
by other, smaller animals). When the next day’s breakfast was to be figs – which 
were typically depleted very quickly – the subjects also tended to position their nests 
en route to the breakfast tree. The chimpanzees therefore appeared to plan their 
routes in order to arrive at the breakfast tree before all the fruit had been eaten. 
Unlike the previous anecdotes, these observations were made systematically over a 
long period of time. However, when studying a wild population it is impossible to 
control for confounds from previous life experience (Thom and Clayton, 2015), and 
controlled manipulations are required to make unambiguous predictions about an 
animal’s behaviour given differing present and future needs.  
Two notable studies in the last decade attempted falsification of the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis in Great apes in a more controlled empirical setting. Both studies 
focused on selection and transport of tools needed to gain access to a food reward 
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in the future. Mulcahy and Call (2006) tested bonobos and orangutans that had been 
trained to use a tool to access fruit juice in a testing room. The apes were then given 
the opportunity to select a suitable tool from an array of unsuitable alternatives, at a 
time when they were unable to access the apparatus containing the fruit juice. The 
subjects were then ushered out of the testing room, and only given access after an 
hour. To successfully acquire the juice therefore, the apes had to select the correct 
tool, carry it outside, keep it, and return to the testing room with it later. They did so 
on 40.9% trials, significantly more often than would be expected by chance. This 
finding was also seen in two subjects tested with a longer delay of 14 hours.  
In order to establish that this behavior was carried out with the future in 
mind, Mulcahy and Call included a control experiment in which subjects were 
rewarded for bringing back the correct tool, but the apparatus was not present and 
the tool was not actually used. This condition therefore tested acquisition of an 
arbitrary contingency between bringing back the tool and getting the juice. As the 
authors predicted, the correct tool was returned reliably less often in this 
experiment than in the previous experiments when the tool had been used. 
However, two of the four subjects in this control experiment never returned the 
correct tool, and so had no opportunity to acquire the contingency being assessed. 
The other two performed similarly to those subjects in the other experiments 
(Suddendorf, 2006). It is therefore possible that the observed behavior can be 
attributed to long-delay instrumental conditioning (Cheke and Clayton, 2010), by 
which the tool could have become associated with the juice reinforcer, facilitated by 
spending the delay outside the testing room, reducing interference (Lett, 1975). 
Furthermore, we know nothing of the subjects’ motivational states at the time of 
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testing. This same criticism applies to a more recent attempt to replicate Mulcahy 
and Call’s first experiment (Dufour and Sterck, 2008). The apes could plausibly have 
experienced a present desire for juice without entertaining any particular 
expectation of an encounter with the apparatus. In the absence of a clear cost to 
selecting and keeping the correct tool, we might expect a present desire for juice to 
drive the observed behavior. 
Osvath and Osvath (2008) attempted to overcome this hurdle by introducing 
a self-control element, in which present and future needs are opposed by design. 
Two chimpanzees and an orangutan were given the opportunity to select a tool from 
a tray of alternative items. This tool could be used to access some highly valued fruit 
soup after a 70-minute delay. Initially, the alternative items were non-functional 
tools, and all three subjects reliably chose the functional tool. In the second 
experiment, however, one of the alternative items was a piece of the animal’s 
favourite fruit. The subjects therefore faced a choice between an immediately 
available piece of fruit, and the prospect of future access to a more valuable fruit 
reward using the functional tool. All three subjects selected the tool on significantly 
more than the expected 0% of trials.  
A third experiment controlled for the possibility that the functional tool had 
become a secondary reinforcer via its association with the fruit soup. The subjects 
were now offered two choices instead of one. The first was between a functional 
tool and several non-functional alternatives, and the second was between another 
functional tool, a piece of fruit, and some non-functional tools. If the tool had 
previously been preferred to the fruit because it had acquired its own reinforcing 
properties, then the apes would have been expected to choose the functional tool 
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twice. Instead, each of the subjects selected the fruit in the second choice on every 
trial. The authors infer from their results that the apes were anticipating their future 
encounter with the fruit soup and their consequent need for a single functional item. 
In a final experiment, all subjects showed an above-chance preference for a novel 
functional tool over some equally novel non-functional alternatives. Osvath and 
Osvath argue that this final finding indicates that their subjects were pre-
experiencing their interaction with the apparatus containing the fruit soup, to 
identify which tool they would need. 
In response to Osvath and Osvath’s paper, Suddendorf et al. (2009) issued a 
commentary urging caution. They note that tool-selection in the second experiment 
was compared to 0%, not to chance. Osvath (2010) responds that chance is not the 
correct comparison, because the presence of an attractive alternative (the favourite 
fruit item) would lead a ‘future blind’ ape to select the functional tool less often than 
chance. This argument is plausible, and it is unfortunate it remained untested. A 
simple control could confirm it using a less attractive fruit alternative, which should 
result in more choices for the functional tool, and fewer for the fruit (and still none 
for the non-functional tools). Applying this control the third experiment could also 
strengthen those findings. Since the value of the fruit is always greater than that of a 
second functional tool, the apes should behave identically and always choose the 
fruit. 
The claims of Osvath and Osvath however rest primarily on the validity of 
their third experiment, which purports to control for associative learning. 
Suddendorf et al. suggest that the apes may have held an expectation of an 
immediate encounter with the apparatus containing the fruit soup, which motivated 
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their initial choice. This would seem surprising since the subjects were never given 
the opportunity to use the tool immediately after selection. However, one aspect of 
the apes’ behavior does appear inconsistent with anticipation of future tool-use. 
Suddendorf et al. note that the researchers were able to retrieve the tool after each 
testing session. If the apes expected to encounter the fruit soup within a trial based 
on past experience, why would they not expect to do so in future trials? If they did, 
we might expect them to guard the functional tool for future use. An alternative to 
this is that the apes also understood that they would always be offered a new tool, 
based on past experience. One way to test this would be to provide a food option at 
both choices. Given foresight, the optimal behaviour would be to pick the tool once, 
guard it between trials, and then benefit from both food rewards and the fruit soup 
on each subsequent trial. 
Finally, Suddendorf and colleagues question whether the paradigm used by 
Osvath and Osvath is capable of testing the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. Since it is not 
clear that desire for the fruit and desire for the fruit soup are ‘qualitatively’ different 
motivational states, there may be nothing to dissociate from. This criticism betrays 
an ambiguity at the heart of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis in its description of 
present and future ‘needs’. The interpretation of needs as drive states is convenient 
for empirical work, but is extremely limiting if applied universally. If the apes were 
indeed pre-experiencing a future encounter with the apparatus containing fruit soup, 
would anticipation of the need for the tool not be sufficient to be considered a type 
of episodic foresight? This problem is also apparent in interpreting other studies of 
tool transportation (e.g. Mulcahy and Call, 2006); it is not clear whether this 
behaviour could ever satisfy the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. 
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The evidence for planning in great ape tool transport is, while impressive, 
inconclusive. This is partly attributable to the considerable practical constraints 
involved when working with these animals. Beyond these constraints however, we 
are left with a critical polysemy in the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. The vague meaning 
of ‘needs’ is clearly a problem for attempts at falsification. Despite the high degree 
of uncertainty in interpretation of the research presented so far in this chapter, it is 
difficult not to be impressed with the apes’ behavior. When tested on a tool-
transport paradigm similar to that of Mulcahy and Call (2006), long-tailed macaques 
only learned to select and transport tools following shaping with immediate rewards 
(Dekleva et al., 2012). Furthermore, this behavior mostly stopped with a longer delay 
of 20 minutes, while Mulcahy and Call’s apes tolerated a 14-hour delay. If the great 
apes show a greater propensity for future-oriented behavior than some other 
primates, it is important to determine whether this is due to a greater capacity for 
foresight. We must therefore consider the evidence for prospective cognition in 
these other primates. 
 
Other primates 
Naqshbandi and Roberts (2006) compared the performance of squirrel monkeys and 
rats in a test of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. The animals were given a series of 
choices between smaller and larger quantities of thirst-inducing food. During the 
task, they had limited access to water, and choosing the smaller food reward 
resulted in earlier (but still delayed) access to the water. All the animals had a 
baseline preference for the larger food reward, and the authors predicted that an 
animal capable of foresight would switch their preference to the smaller food 
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reward as the task progressed. The squirrel monkeys tested did so, but the rats did 
not, leading the authors to conclude that the squirrel monkeys were anticipating 
their future thirst and acting accordingly. In a follow up control experiment with 
water availability matched for the two food rewards, the monkeys preferred the 
larger reward as they had at baseline. This suggests that the dates had not simply 
become less attractive by association with thirst.  
The findings of Naqshbandi and Roberts are promising, and the competition 
between hunger and thirst would seem to meet the requirement for present and 
future motivational states to be ‘qualitatively’ different. Given the problems 
associated with small study samples however, it should be noted that only two 
squirrel monkeys were tested. More recent work attempted to replicate this result in 
rhesus macaques (Paxton and Hampton, 2009). The macaques were tested using the 
same paradigm as the squirrel monkeys, but continued to select the larger food 
reward despite the consequent increase in thirst. The authors made systematic 
variations to the procedure, and found that the macaques did switch to choosing the 
smaller food reward when the periods of water deprivation were decreased so that 
there was a 0-minute delay to the return of water when choosing the smaller 
amount. The macaques’ failure in the original task might therefore be attributable to 
a failure to learn the contingency between choice and water availability over long 
delays.  
The authors go further, noting that the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis does not 
state how distant ‘the future’ needs to be. Since their macaques were not thirsty 
when given the choice involving the 0-minute delay (which took as long as needed 
for the experimenters to return access to water), they did seem to be anticipating 
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thirst in the very near future and thus “…technically contradict[ing] the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis”. The oddity of this should be striking. What is implied is either a 
capacity for foresight that cannot extend into the future, or a capacity to anticipate 
future events without the ability to learn to expect those future events. It is difficult 
to envisage the adaptive utility of either. Indeed, enabling an animal to learn about, 
and later anticipate, the long-term consequences of its action seems an important 
advantage of mental time travel. That this is not in any way captured by the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis gives good reason for caution in rejecting out of hand behavior 
that does not meet this particular criterion. 
To summarise, the evidence for prospective mental time travel in a non-
human primate is promising, but far from conclusive. There have been no 
undeniable and replicated falsifications of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. This is 
partly due to practical difficulties inherent research, but also due to ambiguities in 
the hypothesis itself. In the next section, we consider attempts to challenge the 
Bischof-Köhler hypothesis in a completely different clade: the corvids. 
 
The corvids 
The corvids are a family of songbirds including crows, ravens, and jays. They share 
several important characteristics with primates which have made them attractive 
prospects for research into comparative cognition: they have large brains for their 
body sizes (Emery and Clayton, 2004; Jerison, 1973), some corvids are capable of 
using tools (Bird and Emery, 2009; Taylor et al., 2007) and of manufacturing them 
(Bird and Emery, 2009; Weir and Kacelnik, 2006), and some species appear to 
demonstrate impressive understanding of social problems (Bugnyar and Heinrich, 
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2005; Emery and Clayton, 2001; Ostojic et al., 2013; Seed et al., 2008). Because 
corvids are very distant relatives to humans and other primates, their intelligence is 
believed to have evolved independently to and in parallel with our own (Emery and 
Clayton, 2004). Since this is a case of convergent evolution, Morgan’s Canon can 
draw support from phylogenetic parsimony in a way it cannot not when we consider 
great ape intelligence. Nonetheless, our null hypothesis – the Bischof-Köhler 
hypothesis – is identical. 
 The focus of much research into corvid prospective cognition has been a 
single species: the Western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica). There are two 
reasons for this. The first is that scrub-jays naturally engage in a future-oriented 
behavior suitable for exploration; they cache food for future consumption. The 
second reason is that scrub-jays find and retrieve their caches using flexible memory 
recall that has been described as analogous to the retrospective component of 
human mental time travel – episodic memory (Clayton et al., 2003; Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1998). 
Two studies of scrub-jay caching behaviour purport to demonstrate 
prospective mental time travel. Raby et al. (2007) describe an experiment in which 
scrub-jays must ‘plan for breakfast’ by distributing caches appropriately between 
two rooms in which they might wake the following morning. Correia et al. (2007) 
report a falsification of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, in which the birds were 
presented with opposing desires for present and future. 
Raby et al. (2007) report two experiments, which took place in a set of three 
adjacent cages. In Experiment 1, the scrub-jays were shut each morning into one of 
the end cages. One cage – the ‘breakfast room’ – contained food; the other – the ‘no 
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breakfast room’ – did not. For the rest of the day, the birds had access to all rooms. 
Each evening, a caching tray was inserted into each of the two end rooms, but only 
non-cacheable powdered food was available. After three mornings spent in each of 
the end cages, the birds were given a caching test in which the evening’s powdered 
food was replaced with whole (cacheable) pine nuts. The birds cached significantly 
more pine nuts in the ‘no breakfast room’ than they did in the ‘breakfast room’.  
The second experiment was similar to the first, but the ‘breakfast’ and ‘no breakfast’ 
rooms were replaced by a ‘peanut room’, in which peanuts were available for 
breakfast, and a ‘kibble room’, in which kibble was available for breakfast. Therefore, 
specific satiety – consumption dependent devaluation of a particular food type – 
would have resulted in satiety for peanuts in the peanut cage, and for kibble in the 
kibble room. At the caching test, the birds preferentially cached peanuts in the 
kibble room, and kibble in the peanut cage. In other words, they cached what they 
would want at recovery, and where they would want it.  
It has been argued that these results contrast with the predictions of an 
associative account, according to which the animals would have preferentially 
cached the foods in the cages already associated with those foods. This argument is 
derived from the fact that rats (Rattus norvegicus) eat more in rooms associated 
with food (Petrovich et al., 2007), and that scrub-jay caching behaviour is partially 
controlled by the motivational system that governs eating (de Kort et al., 2007) – 
presumed to be relatively similar in birds and rats. However, the observed 
distribution of caches could also result from a preference to spread stores somewhat 
evenly. Such a preference would be entirely spatial, and would not entail foresight. 
We should be wary of post hoc heuristic accounts, since it is possible to end up with 
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an overwhelming accumulation of ‘simple rules’ that look decidedly less simple en 
masse. Nonetheless, a preference for spreading food stores is plausible because we 
have reason to think scrub-jays might already possess just such a preference. Scrub-
jays are scatter hoarders, unlike rats, which tend to store their caches in one or a 
few places (Vander Wall, 1990). This difference in storing preference must be 
underpinned by some psychological disparity. If this psychological disparity is a 
consequence of a capacity for foresight, then we should expect all scatter hoarders 
to be capable of foresight, which is a strong claim indeed. Conversely, if this 
psychological disparity between rats and scrub-jays is not related to foresight, then 
so might be the difference in observed behaviour in the ‘planning for breakfast’ task. 
Because of this alternative explanation, the findings presented by Raby et al. cannot 
make a conclusive case for prospective mental time travel in scrub-jays. 
Correia et al. presented scrub-jays with the opportunity to cache while their 
present desires were in conflict with the desires they would experience in the future, 
at retrieval. The birds’ motivational states at caching and retrieval were manipulated 
by pre-feeding with either peanuts or kibble to induce specific satiety. Half of the 
birds were pre-fed the same food prior to both caching and recovery (the ‘Same’ 
group), half were pre-fed different foods (the ‘Different’ group). In the ‘Different’ 
group this induced a conflict, because scrub-jays typically prefer to cache what they 
want to eat right now (Clayton and Dickinson, 1999). On the first trial, when the 
birds had no knowledge of what their states would be at retrieval, both groups 
preferentially cached the non-pre-fed food. However, on trials 2 and 3, this pattern 
was reversed in the ‘Different’ group but not in the ‘Same’ group. The authors 
concluded that the birds in the Different group overcame their current motivational 
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state in order to cache what they would want at retrieval, thus falsifying the Bischof-
Köhler hypothesis. 
A commentary on Correia et al.’s study produced two main criticisms 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2008). First, the birds in the ‘Same’ group had been 
presented with more of the pre-fed food type across the course of the experiment 
than birds in the ‘Different’ condition. This is true, but it is unclear why this should 
have affected the birds’ motivational states. All birds in both groups had prior 
experience of the pre-fed food types from previous studies, and all birds had ad 
libitum access to a range of maintenance food types in between trials. Furthermore, 
subsequent work with Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) – another corvid species – 
replicated the findings of Correia et al. using a within-subject design that prevents 
this problem (Cheke and Clayton, 2012). 
The second criticism focuses on the use of proportions of food types cached 
in the analysis, rather than absolute numbers. These proportions were criticised for 
reflecting a reduction in caching of the pre-fed food, rather than an increase in 
caching of the non-pre-fed food. In other words, the birds did not appear to 
anticipate a future need for the non-pre-fed food, but instead to anticipate that they 
would not need the pre-fed food. However, this is precisely the one ought to expect 
given that they began on trial 1 by caching both food types (Clayton et al., 2008). If 
the birds had anticipated that they would want more of any food at retrieval they 
would be wrong! The pre-feeding with one food type before retrieval reduced the 
value of that food type most, but also reduced the value of all foods through its 
effect on general satiety. Put in lay terms, knowing that you plan to have savoury 
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leftovers for dinner should stop you from buying yourself more savoury food, not 
encourage you to buy extra dessert. 
The evidence from scrub-jay caching is suggestive of a capacity for 
representing a future motivational state that differs from that being presently 
experienced. The findings of Correia et al. (2007) and Cheke and Clayton (2012) 
particularly appear to contradict the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis. It is not however 
clear that we can conclude from this that scrub-jays are able to engage in 
prospective mental time travel. It has been noted that many studies of scrub-jay 
cognition focus on food-caching, perhaps implying a narrow focus for their abilities 
that contrasts with the broad range of future experiences that humans can envisage 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2010). However, it is entirely possible that the emphasis 
on caching is a matter of empirical convenience rather than a cognitive limitation. It 
could therefore be that scrub-jays are indeed capable of foresight beyond a caching 
context, but we simply have not tested for it. 
Recent work in Eurasian jays hints at an avenue for research into foresight in 
a non-caching context. Male jays share food with their partners in breeding season, 
and researchers asked whether they anticipate their partners’ desires when doing so 
(Ostojic et al., 2013). They pre-fed the females on one of two food types in order to 
induce specific satiety, and then gave the males a choice of food types to share. The 
males preferentially selected and shared the non-pre-fed food, in accordance with 
their partners’ motivational states. Importantly, this preference was only seen when 
the males could observe the pre-feeding, so the females were not just cueing the 
males’ choices behaviourally. Subsequent work suggests that the males’ food 
selection is partially driven by their own motivational state (Ostojic et al., 2014). The 
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birds therefore needed to overcome their own desires in order to act to satiate their 
partner’s desires. Given that the selection of food was necessarily made before 
sharing, and because the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis does not state how far into the 
future a ‘future need’ should be (Paxton and Hampton, 2009), it could be argued 
that food-sharing does indeed provide evidence of foresight beyond caching. 
Whether or not one finds the case of food-sharing convincing as a potential 
example of prospective cognition, the emphasis on caching in studies of scrub-jay 
cognition ought not to be surprising, for two reasons. Firstly, scrub-jays devote much 
of their time, energy, and attention to caching, so that is the most obvious 
manifestation of their cognitive abilities. Consider the analogous example of tool-use 
in corvids. New Caledonian crows make and use tools in the wild (Orenstein, 1972), 
and appear to exhibit understanding of novel physical problems (e.g. Weir and 
Kacelnik, 2006). Similar behaviour was later reported from laboratory studies with 
Rooks, which are not natural tool-users (Bird and Emery, 2009). From observations 
of rooks in the wild, we would never have known that they could learn to 
manufacture tools, simply because they do not naturally experiment with objects as 
New Caledonian crows do. In the case of tool-use, the Rook studies were conducted 
because similar work had already been carried out with New Caledonian crows. In 
the absence of any unambiguous non-caching demonstrations of episodic foresight 
in a non-human animal, it is not obvious what form a non-caching paradigm should 
take. This leads us to a potentially more troubling concern. The Bischof-Köhler 
hypothesis is intended as a conservative test of non-human foresight, so there may 
be instances of behaviour for which foresight might be a plausible explanation, but 
where competing explanations cannot be ruled out. It is possible that the narrow 
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focus of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis on anticipation of future needs so restricts 
the range of behaviours from which prospective cognition can be inferred that 
caching provides the only conclusive examples. If this is indeed the case, we must 
consider whether the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis continues to be a useful tool for 
research into future-oriented behaviour. 
 
The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis reconsidered 
We have reviewed a range of studies in primates and corvids that purport to 
examine foresight. A consistent concern has been whether the behaviour in these 
studies meets the standards of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, namely anticipation of 
future needs that differ from the animal’s present needs. One problem has been the 
ambiguity of the word ‘needs’, and whether ‘motivational state’ is an appropriate 
proxy. Even when behaviour appears to contradict the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, 
such as in the case of the Western scrub-jay, we can still draw very few conclusions 
about the animal’s prospective capacities when compared to our own. 
 It is instructive to consider application of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis to our 
own species. Humans are certainly able to anticipate future needs. As an example, 
we must know that we will need to eat later in the week when going food shopping. 
If a holiday is approaching and family are visiting for a large meal, we will buy more 
food than usual. This is clearly an example of acting for the future with the future in 
mind. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily the case that we dissociate completely from 
the context of our present motivational state when we engage in this behaviour. 
Indeed, shopping for food is very much influenced by current hunger (Nisbett and 
Kanouse, 1969), even though that hunger is a temporary state, unlikely to affect our 
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needs in the coming days. It is furthermore unclear whether the desire for food now 
and the anticipated desire for food later would be considered ‘qualitatively different’ 
needs. 
 What we are left with, then, is a criterion that is neither sufficient nor 
necessary to indicate prospective mental time travel: one can imagine future events 
without dissociating from present desires, and act for future needs without pre-
experiencing them. The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis has been provided an important 
focus for comparative research into prospective cognition, and has encapsulated the 
principles laid out in Morgan’s Canon. However, it has also proven highly restrictive 
as a null hypothesis. We believe that future research will benefit from the 
development of new criteria for future-oriented cognition. 
 
Continuity and criteria 
The logical starting point for development of a behavioural criterion for prospective 
cognition is with human mental time travel. Indeed, it is because we recognise the 
importance of this capacity in many behaviours that seem to be uniquely human 
that we might ask whether foresight represents a discontinuity between our species 
and other animals. However, there is a risk that this approach is too modular, and 
that it would be more beneficial to concentrate on individual processes contributing 
to foresight, rather than the entire cognitive system. 
The mental time travel hypothesis lays out an array of cognitive prerequisites 
for the mental time travel seen in humans, including mental attribution, meta-
representation, and the ability to dissociate oneself from the context of the present 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997). The evolution of human foresight could be a case 
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of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Gould and Eldredge, 1977), in which these component 
processes emerged rapidly in the short time since our split from the chimpanzee 
lineage. What would be left is a cognitive chasm between humans and the rest of 
the Animal Kingdom; a difference in kind rather than degree. If this is not the case, 
then we must consider the possibility that these processes emerged gradually, with 
some degree of continuity between species. Either way, it is important to ask 
whether the component processes of mental time travel facilitate future-oriented 
action on their own, or whether they are co-opted for that purpose following the 
emergence of other components. Put simply, does an incomplete mental time travel 
system – relative to our own – help an animal to act for the future? Where there is a 
degree of phylogenetic continuity in the processes required for mental time travel, 
we must consider how each process contributes to future-oriented action in the 
species endowed with them. Doing so could allow us to relate species differences to 
differences in ecological demands, and so shed light on the selective forces that 
shaped the evolution of our own minds.  
Corballis (2013; 2014)  argues that continuity in hippocampal processing 
indicates that species differences in foresight are indeed a matter of degree rather 
than kind. The hippocampus has been implicated as critical in human prospective 
mental time travel, from neuroimaging studies (e.g. Addis et al., 2007), and from 
behavioural research on patients with hippocampal damage (Klein et al., 2002; 
Rosenbaum et al., 2005). The hippocampus is also important for spatial processing, 
containing ‘place cells’ that fire in response to being in a particular location (O'Keefe 
and Nadel, 1978). Indeed, it has been argued that a key function of the hippocampus 
in prospection is to provide a spatial framework for imagined future scenes (Hassabis 
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et al., 2007a; Hassabis et al., 2007b; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). The evidence for 
continuity comes from activity in rat hippocampal place cells outside of the spatial 
context to which they refer (Wilson and McNaughton, 1994). This activity can 
correspond to routes that had not been previously navigated (Gupta et al., 2010), 
and even to routes that the animal takes subsequently (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). 
We agree that this activity is at least consistent with some component of foresight, 
and is a plausible building block for the development of human mental time travel 
(Thom and Clayton, 2014).  
 
Future directions 
It is our belief that comparative research has been excessively focused on fulfillment 
of a behavioural criterion for foresight. Any such criterion can only ever provide us 
with an arbitrary cut-off point, with some species being deemed capable and others 
not. This is both unsatisfactory and uninformative. There will always be those who 
will view any criterion that admits non-human planning as too lax, as there will be 
those who view dismissal of some such planning as too strict. A single criterion for 
prospective mental time travel is unlikely to satisfy neither camp. Indeed, 
Suddendorf and Corballis (1997; 2007; see also Suddendorf, 2013) present mental 
time travel as a concoction of various contributory mechanisms. This variety in 
theory must be reflected in the focus of empirical work. 
More importantly however, the single criterion approach cannot actually tell 
us much about the evolution of cognition. A single criterion necessarily dismisses 
subtle variations in prospective cognition between species. Small variations in 
processes that are continuous between species give us the opportunity to ask the 
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evolutionary questions we began this chapter with. We can compare these 
variations to differences in species’ ecologies in order to discern their associated 
adaptive advantages. Similarly, we can ask whether different starting points in cases 
of convergent evolution offer different constraints on the subsequent evolution of 
individual processes. It is these processes that should, in our opinion, be the focus of 
attention in comparative research into prospective mental time travel. Our 
suggested approach should take its cues from recent neurobiological work, which 
has made great strides in elucidating the material causes of episodic foresight.  
We finish with an example. A defining feature of mental time travel, when 
compared with semantic memory and non-episodic planning, is that past and future 
events are experienced in the mind’s eye (e.g. Tulving, 2002; Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 1997). It has been argued that this feature depends on constructive 
processes – supported by medial temporal brain areas – that establish a spatial 
framework for the event (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). This is consistent with work 
demonstrating hippocampal activity during episodic recall and prospective 
simulation of the future (e.g. Addis et al., 2007), and also in imagination of an event 
without any specified time (Hassabis et al., 2007a). Indeed, patients with 
hippocampal amnesia appear to show impairments in imagination of spatially 
coherent scenes, but not of single objects (Hassabis et al., 2007b). The processes 
underpinning ‘scene construction’ form a small but vital component of mental time 
travel. In order to shed light on their evolutionary history, we need to know how 
they contribute to planning behaviour across species, as well as any role they play in 
behaviour that is not obviously connected with mental time travel. 
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Fortunately for the purposes of comparative research, scene construction has 
been linked to a measurable behavioural phenomenon: boundary extension. 
Boundary extension is the phenomenon whereby people typically report seeing 
more of a scene than they actually did, resulting in a more ‘zoomed out’ view 
(Intraub and Richardson, 1989). In other words, the boundaries of the scene have 
been extended beyond their natural limits. The link between boundary extension 
and hippocampal construction rests on two planks. First, boundary extension has 
been associated with hippocampal activity during initial exposure to a scene 
(Chadwick et al., 2013). Secondly, the tendency towards boundary extension in 
healthy individuals produces a paradoxical advantage to recall in patients with 
hippocampal amnesia (Mullally et al., 2012). Boundary extension in a ‘match-to-
sample’ task might therefore be taken as a useful indicator of ‘scene construction-
like’ processes, though oriented to the past rather than the future. 
Evidence of this kind should not be taken as evidence that an animal is 
capable of foresight. As we have argued in this chapter, such binary distinctions are 
unproductive and potentially misleading. Indeed, the processes responsible for 
boundary extension might be found in an animal that really cannot think about the 
future (though we are unlikely to ever know this fact with certainty). The 
hippocampal activity associated with boundary extension was observed primarily 
during online perception of a scene, leading the authors to suggest that its function 
might be to provide predictions about the world outside the subject’s field of view. 
This function could be beneficial for navigation, even in the absence of an ability to 
plan the route ahead. Scene construction-like processes might then have been co-
opted to support memory and prospection in some species, but not others.  
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Our highly speculative account of scene construction-like processes is not 
intended as a just-so story of the evolution of prospective cognition, but as an 
illustration of the potential benefits of focusing on processes rather than systems. 
Identifiying variations in these processes and assessing their association with 
environmental demands could offer insight into the selective pressures that shaped 
our minds, and could potentially offer scope for inference about ancestral forms of 
human cognition. 
 
Concluding remarks 
We began with Tinbergen’s two ultimate questions to be asked of prospective 
mental time travel – what are the adaptive advantages conferred by a capacity for 
foresight, and how did our earlier evolutionary history influence the form that 
capacity takes? As a first step towards answering these questions, it is essential to 
identify the extent to which other, non-human animals are able to plan for the 
future with the future in mind.  
The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis has been the main null hypothesis in this 
endeavor, articulating the weakly justifiable preference for ‘lower’ level explanations 
over more cognitive accounts of behaviour. Several studies claim to falsify the 
central tenet of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis – that non-human animals cannot 
anticipate their future needs. The most convincing examples are of tool 
transportation in great apes (Osvath and Osvath, 2008), food selection in squirrel 
monkeys (Naqshbandi and Roberts, 2006), and food-caching in corvids (Correia et al., 
2007; Cheke and Clayton, 2012). These studies are too few in number to be 
absolutely conclusive, but they do suggest that it is time to stop saying that non-
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human animals are ‘stuck in the present’ (a description that has been applied to 
some humans with hippocampal amnesia; Wearing, 2005; Corkin, 2013). 
Some of the criticisms leveled at comparative studies of prospective 
cognition appear to come down to limitations in Bischof-Köhler hypothesis itself. 
While the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis has undoubtedly provided a solid foundation for 
research in this field, it has also been constricting. Its emphasis on anticipation of 
future needs as distinct from understanding the affordances of a task seems 
arbitrary. Determining the means of action can tax our ability to imagine and plan 
just as identifying our goals can. Similarly, the requirement that present and future 
rewards be qualitatively distinct is vague, but would seem to exclude, for example, 
all choices people make about money. 
We believe that the problems seen in the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis are 
inevitable if any single criterion for a particular cognitive faculty is insisted upon. We 
have instead argued for an approach that focuses on individual component 
processes of prospective mental time travel, even if those processes do not 
contribute to planning in the subject animal. It is these processes that will provide 
the variation needed to make meaningful comparisons across phylogeny, and to 
answer the ultimate questions about our own capacity for foresight. It is time to 
start seeing the trees for the wood.  
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